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Within what theoretical framework - the primordialist versus the instrumentalist orien­
tation - can ethnic mobilization and conflict best be explained? Having in mind the debates 
in connection with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, in our paper we address the question did an 
increase in ethnic tensions and subsequent armed conflict between the parties follow the in­
crease in ethnic intolerance? Or, did ethnic intolerance increase as a consequence of the con­
flict itself. The first result would be more in accordance with the primordialist view. The second 
is what would be expected from the instrumentalist one. In order to answer the question we 
used three sets of survey data collected in Croatia in 1985, 1989 and 1996. The period be­
tween the first two surveys was one of rising tensions; the “explosion ” and open armed conflict 
followed (1991-1995). The third survey was done in the inital period of peace.
Our conclusion is that intolerance did not precede but rather followed the outbursts of 
war and the atrocities connected with it. Therefore we argue that our findings are more in ac­
cordance with instrumentalist than with piimordialist theories. Nevertheless, our analysis 
serves only to discredit primordialism rather than providing instrumentalism to be the best ex­
plana toiy theoiy for the Balkans' conflicts.
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Theories and derived predictions
The bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia added one more example for theorists to 
sharpen their arguments. One more site was created to test different explanations of ethnic 
mobilization, conflict and genocide. The new term, ethnic cleansing was added to the vocab­
ulary, regrettably describing an age-old practice.
Different theoretical approaches can be classified in two major groups. First are the 
primordialists whose essential explanation is based on the explosion of repressed “ancient” 
hatred between ethnic groups. The problem for the primordialist approach is not to explain 
conflict but the absence of it. How it is possible that ethnic group are not killing each other 
constantly? Why it is that ethnic groups living in close proximity are much more often collab­
orating than killing each other and even more groups engaged in mutual killing are not doing 
it all the time but the periods of massacres and killings are interspersed with periods of peace 
and collaboration. Primordialists give two possible answers. One is that in spite of permanent 
hatred, under normal conditions that will not explode into violence. Some triggering mecha­
nism is necessary. The most common explanation is that some outside power is suppressing 
the confronted groups from attacking each other. That explanation is often used in the Yugo-
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slav case. Robert Kaplan says that processes of history and memory were “kept on hold” by 
communism for forty five years “thereby creating a kind of multiplier effect for violence” 
(Kaplan, 1993:1). In this perspective an event like the dissolution of Communism, dissolution 
of the state, or the empire are triggering mechanisms which remove the lid from suppressed 
hatred, which is than free to explode.
Another triggering mechanism can be “elite manipulation” and in this way the primor­
dial position comes closer to instrumentalist theories. Instrumentalist theories regard the 
ethnic conflict as the result of elite manipulation. Groups having interest in mobilizing ethnic 
identities for material, ideological or political goals are doing so with more or less success. 
The explanation that the ideological vacuum created by the definitive delegitimization of 
Communism was filled with nationalism is often used.
It is important to notice that the same sequence of observable events can be used to 
confirm primordialist or instrumentalist theory. In the primordialist version for example 
the demise of communism unleashed suppressed hatred. In the instrumentalist version the 
demise of communism creates an ideological vacuum used by elite's to promote national 
mobilization. Where in the first case we have more “bottom-up” explanation where the 
crucial “agents” are “masses” and their hatred, in the second case the crucial actors are 
elites, which in the “top-down” process manipulate the “masses” in order to achieve their 
goals. Consequently, the fact that we have a triggering event (in our case the demise of 
communism) which creates ethnic conflict does not in itself prove or contradict either of 
this approaches. Where these two theories differ is the assumption about ethnic relations 
prior to conflict outbreak. Primordialists assume that the ethnic hatred, intolerance, ani­
mosity is high where instrumentalist would argue that it is low. Even more they (instrumen­
talist) would argue that there is a tendency of hatred, animosity, intolerance to grow as the 
result of elite manipulation. As stated for our case by Susan Woodward: “Outsiders ex­
plained the character of the fighting in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the eth­
nic cleansing and brutal violations of humanitarian law, by citing ethnic conflict, historical 
enmities, and - in the actions of Serbs - genocide. But, in fact, these were the results of the 
wars and their particular characteristics, not the causes. The conditions of breakdown of a 
state and civil order, on the one hand, and the ideologies and goals of nationalist politi­
cians, on the other, came together in alliance only with war to decide national sovereignty 
over land” (1995:237).
The two theoretical approaches predict different patterns of development regarding enmi­
ties between the confronted groups. Primordialists would predict the constant, high level of ani­
mosity before and after the conflict. The sequence would be high animosity under pressure; pres­
sure removed; explosion of conflict. The theories are usually concentrated on explaining conflict 
so the aftermath of open conflict is usually not discussed. Extrapolating the primordialist argu­
ment we can assume that the conflict “solution” can be achieved either by new suppression, new 
balance of power where one group cannot suppress the other as many would argue as the most 
consequent conclusion derived from primordialism - by group separation.1
1 As argued for example by late Croatian president Tuđman: “Croats belong to a different culture - a 
different civilization from the Serbs. Croats are part of Western Europe, part of the Mediterranean tradi­
tion. Long before Shakespeare and Molierc, our writers were translated into European languages. The 
Serbs belong to the East. They are Eastern peoples, like the Turks and Albanians. They belong to the 
Byzantine culture... Despite similarities in language we cannot be together” (Viorst, 1991:74). Tuđman is 
here claiming that the difference is the result of the long historical-development that created people of dif­
ferent two people belonging to different civilizations. For him it automatically follows - he does not feel 
any need to elaborate this - that people belonging to different civilizations cannot live together. The sepa­
ration of two people is justified on the basis of their cultural differences. He even does not claim the exis­
tence of animosity - the existence of cultural differences is enough to justify (explain) separation.
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On the other hand instrumentalist theory predicts that conflict is provoked in the 
top-bottom sequence and ethnic animosity raises (provoked from above) and leads to the ex­
plosion. Although both theories can be reconciled with the sequence of high ethnic hostilities 
predating conflict, from the instrumentalist standpoint hostility is much more a “variable” 
where for the primordialist it is a constant.
Hypotheses
We can derive empirical hypothesis from the two theoretical perspectives regarding the 
levels and dynamics of ethnic animosities. From the primordialist perspective animosities 
pre-date conflict and are more or less constant. From the instrumentalist perspective they 
vary, they respond to elite manipulation and although they can pre-date conflict that is a con­
sequence of elite manipulation which brings them to that level from some previous, lower 
levels.
In our case we can expect that if the primordialists are right the high ethnic intolerance 
should be found before the conflict eruption. The instrumentalists are not denying the possi­
bility that the hatred and animosity can predate conflict but in their perspective it is aroused 
by the elite manipulation. In the instrumentalist perspective intolerance is much more a vari­
able. Consequently the eventual rise of intolerance after the conflict indicates that intoler­
ance was provoked by the conflict and by elite manipulation and not other way around.
Ideological derivates of theoretical debates
Any theoretical debate in social sciences has its ideological derivatives that are the con­
sequences of the debate but very often the inspiration for the production of conjectures and 
hypothesis. The primordialist-instrumentalist debate is not an exception. Nationalists are 
primordialists and anti-nationalists are instrumentalists. The anti-nationalists could be 
primordialist if they distinguish between facts and values (example P. Van der Berghe) al­
though it is difficult to imagine instrumentalists nationalists because for them values are 
facts.
We can mention here an interesting example of how theoretical debates can become 
practically relevant and be used in “non-theoretical spheres of actions.” The War Crime Tri­
bunal in Hague in the process against Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez used social scientists 
as defence and prosecution witnesses. The main goal of prosecution was obviously to impli­
cate the Croatian president Tuđman as a culprit in inciting ethnic hatred, violence, and eth­
nic cleansing of Serbs in Croatia where the defense was trying to negate this. The invited so­
cial scientists framed their testimonies in the “top-down/bottom-up” dilemma. Was the con­
flict incited by the leadership - as claimed by Robert Donia and John Allcock, the prosecu­
tion's witnesses, or did leadership simply responded to the already existing (or increased) in­
tolerance as claimed by the S. G. Meštrović, expert witness for the defence. The implication 
is that if the first is the case than the moral (and legal) responsibility could be placed on the 
shoulder of political leadership. If the second is true then the leadership does not share any 
greater responsibility than the average members of the ethno-national groups. The bot- 
tom-up approach is grounded in the primordialist frame where the top-bottom in the instru­
mentalist. The essence of the Meštrović's argument was that ethnic intolerance and animosity 
was on the rise before Tuđman and HDZ came to power, consequently Tuđman cannot be 
blamed for instigating the animosity which was already there. The argument was developed 
on two levels. The first level was based on the analysis of the historical processes of the “long 
run” - claiming that the history of Balkan's is the history of ethnic hatred and conflicts and 
not the history of cooperation and assimilation which was periodically interrupted as the con­
sequence of broader geopolitical changes as claimed by Donia and Allcock. On the second
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level the shorter period was taken into account where on the basis of some survey and similar 
type of research (including our own), Meštrović argued that the increased animosity and ha­
tred can be detected before of HDZ's consolidation of power. Meštrović tried to depict the 
sequence: increased intolerance; Tuđman comes to power; conflict where Tuđman's coming 
to power happened as an intervening variable but without independent influence on in­
creased animosities and consequently on the conflict which followed. The other side pre­
sented the sequence differently: Tuđman's coming to power; increased intolerance; conflict.
Research design and measurement
In order to answer the questions posed above we used the data from three surveys done 
in Croatia in span of twelve years. The Institute for Social research in Zagreb conducted the 
first survey in the fall of 1984 and the winter of 1985. Using disproportionate stratified ran­
dom sampling framework, approximately 3600 actively employed men and women in Croatia 
were interviewed, about 400 from each of nine major occupational groupings. Based on the 
1985 census data of active population weights were applied to this sample to replicate the 
distribution of occupations in the active working population. After eliminating cases for 
which data are missing, the resultant sample for the analysis contains 3619 cases. Women 
constitute approximately one-third of the sample, concordant with the distribution of women 
in the paid labor force.
In the winter of 1989-1999 a second survey of randomly selected households was con­
ducted, this time in all six republics and the two autonomous provinces of the former Yugo­
slavia. The Consortium of Social Research Institutes in former Yugoslavia conducted the 
survey. We are using here the data from the Croatian survey. Because of different sampling 
procedure it yielded greater numbers of respondents over 60 years of age and it included un­
employed persons. The sample used here is 2510 cases. In 1996 a stratified random sample of 
the population of Croatia 18 years and older was used. The basis for the sample construction 
was the 1991 census. The assumption was that there were no significant changes in the basic 
proportions in sex, age and education. Assumed are changes resulting from the war and the 
transition from self-management to capitalist economy (increase number of unemployed and 
retired, shifts in territorial concentration depending on how much certain regions were ex­
posed to war activities and dramatic decline in the number of ethnically Serbs). The inter­
views were conducted in 148 settlements. All 19 “Županijas” centers (regional centers) were 
taken into sample. The 128 other settlements were determined from the settlement list using 
random sampling procedure. For every settlement the quota's were determined based on ed­
ucation, employment status, sex and age based on the weight of the settlement in “Županija” 
and Županija weights in the total population. Within the settlement streets and districts were 
chosen randomly. The total sample consists of 2202 cases.
The battery of questions using five-point Likert scales measured the dependent vari­
able, national tolerance. There was a set of four questions used in all three surveys (see Table 
1) and set of five questions used in 1989 and 1996 surveys (see Table 2). All independent vari­
ables used in analysis - based on 1989 and 1996 surveys - are listed in Table 5.
There are four basic sets of independent variables: demographic (national identity, sex, 
age etc.), socio-economic status (education, unemployment, blue-collar, manager etc.), polit­
ical participation (activity in civic and political organizations, reading newspapers, religiosity) 
and for 1996 war experiences and psychological war effects.
Historical periods
Every of the three surveys was conducted in completely different historical periods and 
our main interest is in detecting if (and how) this differences are reflected in the tolerance
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levels. The year 1984 was still solidly a period of communism. After Tito's death in 1980 the 
system was in permanent economic crisis and more or less frustrated attempts to introduce 
economic and political changes which would allow overcoming of the permanent crisis. Liv­
ing standards were seriously eroded. From 1979 to 1984 real personal incomes fell 34% and 
pensions 40%. The inflation was exploding 1980 - 30%, 1981 - 46%, and 1984 - 53% 
(Bilandžić, 1986:116, 118). This was the period when Yugoslavia was desperately looking for 
IMF help. In 1983 the federal parliament accepted a federal guarantee for all debts regard­
less if republics, companies, or federation owed them. Painful changes in accordance with 
classical IMF recipes (reduction in public consumption, moves toward convertibility of the 
dinar, price liberalization, inflation control, etc.) were accepted. The obvious crisis translated 
into the constant political debate and the production of political documents that were 
blocked by disagreements in the political elite's about the implementation strategy. The de­
bate about the cure between centralizers and decentralizers become more and more heated.
In October 1984 the Serbian party issued a draft program advocating strong 
recentralization in the form of the strengthening of federal government and especially reduc­
ing the prerogatives of the autonomous provinces (both of which were in Serbia). That pro­
voked strong backlash lead by the Slovenian and Croatian parties (Ramet, 1992:217-220). 
The political debate and debate among intellectuals about centralization and recentralization 
were dominating the public arena. In spite of this debate did not spill over into more open 
and intensive nationalist confrontation. With exception of Kosovo were ethnic tension 
erupted in 1981 (Bilandžić, 1996:70-78) political debate at the top did not spill over into the 
conflicts among the ordinary people. In Croatia from time to time there were some isolated 
expressions of the nationalist sentiments. At the time of our survey (September, 1984), for 
example, a group of young people from Duvno were arrested for singing songs praising the 
wartime pro-fascist Croatian leader Ante Pavelić and they all received prison terms. But that 
could not be taken as something special indicating the rise in inter-ethnic tensions.
The survey conducted in 1989 was conducted in completely different situation. Yugosla­
via and communism were in agony. The rise to power of Slobodan Milošević in 1987 created 
definite turn toward open confrontation among republic's communist party leaderships. The 
tensions in Kosovo escalated with February workers strike in Trepča, the big mining complex, 
to protest the dismissal of Azem Vlasi, Kosovo's popular ethnic Albanian communist leader, 
on February 23. The Serbian Republican assembly amended its constitution to allow for 
greater Serbian control over Kosovo and Vojvodina against the wishes of the assemblies of 
these provinces, which provoked ethnic Albanian riots in March. At least 29 people were 
killed. (Power, no publication year: 1-2). In September 27 the Slovenian republican Assem­
bly amends its constitution to describe Slovenia as “an independent, sovereign and autono­
mous state.” That provoked huge public protests organized by Milošević in Titograd, and 
Novi Sad with calls for military takeover in Slovenia. The big rally of hundred thousand Serbs 
in Ljubljana, capital of Slovenia, was called for 1 December. Slovenia banned it and closed its 
borders. Croatian Assembly (at the time still the Communist assembly) decided to support 
Slovenia against Serbia.
That was the time of first steps of political pluralism in Croatia. The political move­
ments were legalized. Although the first free elections were held only in the spring 1990, the 
political propaganda with strong nationalist overtones started to dominate the public arena. 
The official recognition of the opposition happened on 10 December. As a response to the 
petition of twelve opposition parties and movements (at that moment half-legal) the presi­
dency of the League of the Communists announced the multiparty elections for the next 
spring (Bilandžić, 1999:767). At the same time from the middle of that year, the strong 
claims for autonomy were put forward by the Croatian Serbs. Under the Milošević influence 
they claimed that if Yugoslavia were to become full-fledged confederation, Serbs would have
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right to create an autonomous province in Croatia. In summer of 1989 an attempt to create a 
Serbian cultural society “Zora” was made. The Croatian authorities banned the society and 
the chief organizer, Jovan Opačić, was jailed. The cause was taken by the Serbia Writers un­
ion that started campaign for the Serbian autonomy in Croatia, paradoxically of the same 
type that was just taken away from the Albanians in Serbia. Bilandžić claims: “From day to 
day among the mass of people the fear of Serbian aggression spread, and also the readiness 
to stand behind those politicians promising to withstand it” (Bilandžić, 1999:761).
We can conclude that our survey in 1989 was conducted during the period of extreme 
political tensions in Yugoslavia, emerging national conflicts including the Serbo-Croatian in 
Croatia which will culminate a year later into the full fledged war, and in the period of rap­
idly emerging political pluralism.
The 1996 survey was conduced in the period immediately after the operations (summer
1995) in which the Croatian territories controlled by the Serbian insurgents. The long period 
in which the Serbian insurgents have cut the territory of Croatia was over producing the high 
enthusiasm on the side of Croats and exodus of Serbs from Croatia. The country was ravaged 
by the war. The total war damage was estimated on 65,330,635 DM (Družić, 2001:37). The 
extension can be understood from the fact that 10.2% of the houses and apartments were de­
molished. The whole parts of Croatia, previously inhabited by Serbs were emptied. At the 
moment of our survey parts of Slavonia (općinas Beli Manastir and Vukovar) were still under 
the UN (UNTAES) control. Basically the remaining Serbian population was living there un­
der the UN protection with the ban for Croatian refugees to return. In this area the situation 
was extremely tense because its immanent return to Croatian control was “written on the 
wall.” We did not enter this area and the survey was not conducted there.
Interpretation
Table 1 gives us a general overview of the dynamic of ethnic tolerance measured by four 
identical questions in all three surveys. The first and most important finding is that the levels 
of tolerance are “behaving” differently in different periods. In the first period (1985-89), 
which is the period of rapid increase of inter-ethnic tensions, a period of increased hostilities 
although not war and ethnic cleansing, individual tolerance actually decreased or at least it 
stayed stable (the actual decrease is from 2.86 to 2.78 on the scale of 1-5 where indicates in­
tolerance). We can see a decline (increase tolerance) in three statements and rise in intoler­
ance in one statement. The increased intolerance (from 2.88 to 3.16) is based on the in­
creased agreement with the statement that “Among nations it is possible to create coopera­
tion, but not full trust.” This jump is obviously reflecting increased tensions among nationali­
ties in Yugoslavia in the observed period.
Table 1. TVends in National Intolerance: Croatia 1985, 1989, 1996
Question 1985 1989 1996
Among nations it is possible to create cooperation, but not full trust. 2.88 3.16 3.75
Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to his 
nation(ality). 2.18 2.13 3.44
Without leaders every nation(ality) is like a man without a head. 4.20 4.04 4.00
Nationally mixed marriages must be more unstable than others. 2.20 1.81 2.61
Average intolerance level 2.86 2.78 3.45
Sample Size 3,619 2,510 2,202
NOTE: All questions were asked using five-point Likert scales. High values indicate strongly agree.
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The second thing to be observed is the highest agreement (in all three observed pe­
riods) with the statement that “Without leaders every nation(ality) is like a man without a 
head.” In another article (Županov, Sekulić, Šporer, 1996) we called this the authoritarian 
syndrome, willingness of people to follow the national(istic) leaders. But we must emphasize 
that in the first observed period the agreement with this statement (although in both years 
being the highest) actually declined (from 4.20 to 4.04).
Another two statements declined (people expressed more tolerant attitudes). In the 
first case (“Man can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to its nation(ality)”) 
the decline is minimal (from 2.18 to 2.13). In the case of the statement “Nationally mixed 
marriages must be more unstable than others” the fall is more substantial (from 2.20 to 1.81).
From the observation of the attitudinal dynamics for the first observed period 
(1985-89) we can conclude:
a) The general level of ethnic tolerance stayed basically the same with the aggregate 
tendency of slight (probably insignificant) decline.
b) Our respondents clearly recognized and reacted to the general deterioration of polit­
ical relationships in the Yugoslav federation - we can cooperate but not trust to each other.
c) The macro-political deterioration did not translate into increased intolerance on the 
personal level - there is no increased feeling that man can feel safe only when living amongst 
co-nationals and that nationally mixed marriages are unstable. We can almost argue that our 
respondents are recognizing the fact of general political inter-national tensions but that they 
refuse to translate this to the individual level.
Even more, the already high authoritarian beliefs that the nationality must be lead by 
strong leader, although still the most agreeable statement, relatively declined. This can prob­
ably reflect the mixed feelings toward newly emerging leaders of nationalist movements who 
started to profile themselves at that time.
Now if we move from the first observed period to the second period (1989-1996), the 
period in which the war actually broke out and endless arrays of horrific atrocities were com­
mitted, the main results show that the ethnic intolerance significantly increased (from the av­
erage level of 2.78 to the average level of 3.45). The tolerance increased on three measured 
items with the exception of the “authoritarian item” which did not increase but kept its first 
ranking as most “agreeable” item. The distance between this item and the other decreased in 
1996 compared with 1989. Although people agree most intensively with the statement that 
“Without the leaders every nation(ality) is like a man without a head” the distance between it 
and the least agreeable statement (“Nationally mixed marriages must be more unstable than 
others”) decreased from 2.23 in 1989 to 1.39 in 1996.
We next turn to a set of tolerance questions, which we use to create standardized scales 
of tolerance for 1989 and 1996 (see Table 2). A new question, “Nationality is important in 
picking a marital partner” becomes available for these years. The question, “Without lead­
ers every nation(ality) is like a man without a head” drops out of the scale because the ex­
tremely high level of agreement with this item makes it nearly an invariant constant. In 
other words, nearly everyone agrees with this item and so it does not help distinguish toler­
ant from less tolerant respondents. We should, of course, remember it as a background 
truth about people's attitudes even though it will not be part of the resulting intolerance 
scale.
The increase in intolerance between 1989 and 1996 is clear and significant. On the scale 
1-5 the jump averages one whole point (the average increases from 2.18 to 3.15) and in all 
used items we have uniform increase in intolerance. The largest relative increase is in the 
item “Men can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to his nation (ality)”, from 
2.13 to 3.44. (This is the item that decreased from 2.18 to 2.13 in 1985-1989 period). It is
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Table 2. Factor Analysis of Intolerance Measures: Croatia 1989 (N = 2,510) and 1996 (N = 2,202)
Tolerance Questions
Means StandardDeviations Communalities
1989 1996 1989 1996 1989 1996
Among nations it is possible to create 
cooperation, but not full trust. 3.16 3.75 1.57 1.25 .306 .422
Men can feel completely safe only when 
the majority belong to his nation(ality). 2.13 3.44 1.51 1.41 .577 .590
Every nation(ality) should have its own state. 2.03 3.15 1.46 1.50 .389 .242
Nationally mixed marriages must be more 
unstable than others. 1.81 2.61 1.34 1.45 .518 .522
Nationality is important in picking a marital 
partner. 1.79 2.78 1.12 1.24 .514 .385
Average 2.18 3.15 1.40 1.37 .461 .432
1989 tolerance scale: Is1 eigenvalue = 2.30, 2nd eigenvalue = 0.85, alpha = .69
1996 tolerance scale: 1st eigenvalue = 2.16, 2nd eigenvalue = 0.88, alpha = .66
NOTES: All questions were asked using five-point Likert scales except “nationality important for pick­
ing a marital partner” which has no middle category and therefore ranges from 1 to 4. High values indi­
cate strongly agree. Communalities are based on one factor solutions.
worth noting that the standard deviations of the items are generally similar across the years 
but average communality decreased perhaps suggesting a loosening of the extent to which 
these variables hang together. But it is important to see that the general decrease in commu­
nality is the result of communalities of different items going in different directions in the two 
compared periods. There is a significant increase in communality of the item about possibi­
lity of cooperation but not full trust and small increases in communality of two other items - 
that men can feel completely safe only among co-nationals and that nationally mixed marria­
ges are more unstable than others. But there is also significant decrease in communality in 
the statement that every nationality should have its own state and that nationality is impor­
tant in picking the marriage partners.
The increase of intolerance is then also accompanied with the loosening of the 
communality structure of items. The loosening indicates the greater flux in attitudes in the 
second period.
The interim conclusions
How are our results fitting into the two main frameworks developed on the beginning of 
the paper? The clear conclusion that ethnic intolerance did not increase prior to the outburst 
of the conflict but it increased after the conflict. The conclusion is that our data does not sup­
port the “bottom-up” theory. The conflict cannot be attributed to the increased ethnic hatred 
and intolerance (at least not on the way we measured it) because increase in intolerance did 
not precede the explosion of the conflict. The opposite is true - after the conflict the intoler­
ance has increased. It does not follow, however, that by this the opposite of “bottom up” the­
ory, the “top down” is confirmed, unless we assume that this are the only alternatives and 
that by disproving one we are automatically confirming the other.
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Explanation of change
Next we address the question of what contributed to the increase in intolerance in the 
1989-1996 period. The obvious answer is of course the war and atrocities connected with it. 
This is our main argument - individual intolerance increased as a consequence of the war. It 
did not precipitate the war because it was flat in period preceding the war events. Here we 
try to detect social mechanisms through which the war “penetrates” onto individual level and 
influences the changes in tolerance. In the process we could test some alternative explana­
tions. We must also allow for the possibility that the processes of change are happening on 
the level undetectable using individual level measures.
a) War experience
The most obvious explanatory mechanism of the influence of war on tolerance is the in­
dividual experience of war. We can hypothesise that because large numbers of people were 
exposed to the war events their intolerance will increase as consequence. The consequence 
of this hypothesis is also that there will be statistically significant difference in intolerance be­
tween those exposed to the war events and those who were not. This hypothesis based on the 
“individualistic bias” of the survey research. The social phenomenon, the average tolerance 
level, is simply treated as the sum of individual level tolerances. If something happened to 
the individuals (the participation in war or direct war effects) that will translate into their 
change of tolerance levels and the aggregate tolerance level will change.
As it can be seen from the Table 3 we have several indicators of the war experience. Al­
most 19% of people served in the military reflecting the nature of the armed conflict. Croatia 
did not have regular army, instead the war was fought with various militias, several party lead 
small armies, mobilized people to defend their villages and towns etc. The army was build 
during the war gradually incorporating various spontaneously emerged resistance groups. All 
of this resulted in such large number of people serving in different types of military units. It 
is estimated that over 300,000 people participated in military operations as members of some 
military units (this only on the Croatian side).
Table 3. Independent Variables: Croatia 1989 (N = 2,510) and 1996 (N = 2,202)
Analysis Variables
Means Standard Deviations
1989 1996 1989 1996
Tolerance .000 -1.034 1.000 .955
DEMOGRAPHIC
Croat .741 .922 .438 .268
Serb .120 .031 .326 .173
Minority Nationality .139 .047 .331 .182
Age 43.189 46.155 14.787 16.262
Male .490 .475 .500 .500
Urbanism (1-6) 3.502 3.170 1.868 1.849
Mixed parentage .107 .069 .309 .254
Mixed marriage .153 .063 .360 .243
STATUS
Education (1-8) 4.080 3.842 1.750 1.562
Not in labor force .161 .357 .368 .479
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Means Standard Deviations
Analysis Variables
1989 1996 1989 1996
Unemployed .040 .106 .196 .308
Peasant .152 .084 .359 .278
Blue-collar .268 .109 .443 .312
White-collar .244 .230 .432 .425
Manager .015 .032 .120 .176
Professional .120 .082 .325 .275
PARTICIPATION
Communist Party .243 .126 .429 .332
Work Organizations .224 .204 .417 .403
Civic Organizations .354 .158 .697 .436
Read News (1-4) 2.298 2.601 .589 .786
Religiosity .000 .768 1.000 .875
WAR EXPERIENCES
Served in Military - .186 - .389
Months Served (In) - .430 - .998
War Experiences (20) - 1.995 - 2.726
War Losses (6) - .506 - 1.541
PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS -
Fearful in Last 5 Years (1-5) - 2.412 - 1.240
Post-Traumatic Stress Scale - 2.567 - 3.306
NOTE: 1989 means and standard deviations are used to standardize both the 1989 and the 1996 to­
lerance and religiosity scales.
The war with no clear front lines and engulfing large segments of territory produced 
high levels of war experiences and losses. As in every modern war, and especially the type of 
ethnic - secessionist conflict having elements of the civil war, the casualties on the civilian si­
de are very high. For example, according to the Croatian Ministry' of Information in the pe­
riod August 17 - December 30, 1991 the total number of killed on the Croatian side was 2853 
of which 1405 were civilians. The total number of wounded was 15,110 of which 4882 were ci­
vilians. Half of the killed were civilians, which indicates the blurred front lines and heavy toll 
payed by the civilian population and which highlights at the same time the high incidence of 
direct war experience. In same places, like Vukovar, the estimates are that much higher num­
ber of civilians was killed than members of the active military. (The estimates at the time we­
re 600 of 1100 total death). The psychological effects are also visible and are extremely high.
b) Demographic change
Croatia went in the 1989-1996 through period of the most dramatic demographic 
change that is also visible from the Table 3. More detailed data on ethnic composition change 
is given in Table 4.
The most visible and dramatic change is the ethnic-national composition of Croatia. 
The proportion of Croats jumped in our 1996 survey compared with 1989 survey from 74.1%
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Croat 77.6% 72.7% 74.1% 92.2%
Serb 11.8 12.5 12.0 3.1
Yugoslav 8.4 10.8 9.2 0.5
Hungarian 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.3
Slovenian 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.3
Muslim 0.5 1.7 1.5 1.1
Czech 0.3 not asked 0.3 0.6
Italian 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1
Montenegrin 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.1
Other Minorities 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.7
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
1 Three census categories are excluded from the base population for the calculation of these percent­
ages: (1) nisu se izjasnili ni opredijelili prema čl. 170. Ustava SFRJ (0.4%), (2) izjasnili se u smislu 
regionalne pripadnosti (0.2%), and (3) nepoznato (1.4%).
2 Garth: Does the 1993 Croatian census provide some figures for this column? If not, we can delete it.
to 92.2% (1991 census indicated 77.9% of ethnic Croats in Croatia.). On the other hand the 
proportion of Serbs declined from 12.0% in 1989 survey to 3.1% in 1996 survey (with 11.8% 
Serbs in Croatia according to 1991 census). This dramatic shift is the result of the war, espe­
cially of its final stage. The most visible moment of the Serbian exodus was in August 1995 
when with the fall of the “Republika srpska” army “... tens of thousands of Serbs began to 
pour out of Croatia in a mass exodus through two gateways left open deliberately by the 
Croat army, at Srb in Lika and Dvor in Banija” (Tanner, 1997:297). The estimate is that in 
this few days of successful Croatian offensive around 120,000 Serbs left their homes into the 
permanent exodus (Žunec, 1998:131, 139). The total number of Serbs who left Croatia in 
1991-1998 period is estimated around 280,000 (Hrvatska vojska, 2000:95).
The total number of Serbs according the 1991 census was 580,762 (Statistički bilten, 
1992:14). If we compare these two numbers we can conclude that 48.2% of Serbs left and 
were expelled (ethnically cleansed) from Croatia. If this numbers reflects the real social pro­
cesses than we could expect that in our sample we would have 6-7% of Serbs. That we have 
only 3.1% probably reflects several processes. First, the tendency of “ethnic homogenisation” 
was going on even regardless of specific war events. That was the argument developed by R. 
Petrović (1987) and if that was the case than we can expect continuos reduction of Serbs in 
Croatia especially taken into account the political developments in the period. Secondly we 
could expect large number of “passing” where people who previously declared their national­
ity as Yugoslavs, (104,728 according to 1991 census), nationally undeclared 76,166 in 1991) or 
even some Serbs were now declaring themselves as Croats. More importantly the survey was 
not conducted in two municipalities (iopćina), Beli Manastir and Vukovar, which at the time 
were still under UNTAES control. The Serbs were significant minorities in this two munici­
palities and we can expect that their exclusion would produce decrease of Serbs in the total 
sample (in 1991 Beli Manastir had 25.5% Serbs in the population and Vukovar 37.4%).
The territories were the Serbian minority was concentrated before the war become to­
tally emptied. “From Karlovac in the north to Split in the south, the interior of Croatia was a
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charred wasteland - mile upon mile of burned-out houses and ruined churches. What had 
not been burned down by the Serbs in 1991 because it was Croatian had been burned down 
in 1995 because it was Serbian” (Tanner, 1997:301).
Such dramatic demographic change alone can produce significant shifts in aggregate 
tolerance levels. Namely, as we know from our previous research (Massey, Hodson, Sekulić,
1999) the tolerance levels differ according to ethnicity and structural position. (Table 3, 
Massey at al., 1999:688). The average level of tolerance (measured on the 1-5 scale) was 3.53 
for Croats living in Croat dominated areas and statistically significantly higher for Serbian 
minority living among them (3.67). On the other hand for Serbs living in Serbian dominated 
areas (what later become Krajina region) was 3.36 - although not statistically significant but 
still lower than for Croats and significantly lower than for Serbs living dispersed among 
Croats. On the basis of demographic change we can than expect that average level of toler­
ance will be going up (the least tolerant group - Serbs in the enclave - Krajina region - are 
the dominant group among the Serbs who left Croatia). The average tolerance level of Serbs 
will appear higher because the Serbs that lived dispersed among Croats stayed mostly in 
Croatia while the less tolerant Serbs from enclaves were pushed out.
The long-term tendency of population aging is worsened as the consequence of the war. 
This is reflected in our sample structure where the average age is three years more in 1996 
than in 1989 (see Table 3). This reflects war losses and the tendency of younger people to 
emigrate. On the other hand increase in age should influence an increase in tolerance levels 
because in our previous research we have found that age is positively correlated with toler­
ance (Massey et al., 1999:684).
But there are other demographic changes that should clearly operate in direction of de­
creasing the tolerance levels. In the first place we witness dramatic decrease in the propor­
tion of people with mixed parentage and of mixed marriages. The first category decreased 
from 10.7% of sample on 6.9%, the second from 15.3% to 6.3%. As we know (Massey et al., 
1999:684) both categories of people are more tolerant than the others. The decrease proba­
bly reflects shifts reflecting the consequences of war and pressure toward ethnic homogenisa­
tion. The people having mixed marriages were under social pressure resulting in large num­
ber of them leaving Croatia, anecdotal evidence suggest that many mixed marriages under 
pressure dissolved and probably some “passing” of marriage partners took place. The di­
vorces, of course, are not decreasing the “mixed parentage” category (that is probably the 
reason why the decline in “mixed parentage” is slightly milder than in “mixed marriages”) 
but two other processes - leaving the country and “passing” are involved.
Decreased urbanism reflects the demographic shift and influx of refugees into rural ar­
eas of Croatia. On the same scale as the Serbs were leaving, the Croats (and Muslims) were 
entering Croatia fleeing the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Hrvatska vojska, 1999:94). Ac­
cording to the official data (which are probably underestimating the real trends), in the 
1991-98 period the influx of people from Bosnia and Herzegovina was in the magnitude of 
262,432 people (Družić, 2001:43). It is important to note that the educational qualifications 
of these immigrants are much lower than the average level in Croatia. A. Wertheimer-Baletić 
(2000:16) estimates that in the 1991-98 period between 130,000 and 150,000 predominantly 
young and educated people left Croatia. Combining these changes produces an increase in 
the age of the sample from 43 to 46 years and a slight decrease in educational levels.
c) Occupational structure
The occupational structure reflects dramatic social changes and we can expect its nega­
tive influence on tolerance. There is a dramatic jump in those not in labour force and unem­
ployed on the one hand and a decrease of blue-collar workers but also of peasants indicates
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the devastation of industry and agriculture in Croatia. The economic activity declined and in 
spite of the fact that the government was efficient in curbing inflation the price paid was in 
suffocating the economic activity (Sirotković, 1996:168-191). Official data show an increase 
of unemployment of 3.5 times (1990-1999 period) (Lokin, 2000:220). In 1996 the number of 
unemployed (250,000) was 55% higher than in 1990 (Sirotković, 1996:166). There was also 
an increase in the retired population of 40% between 1990 and 1999 (Lokin, 2000:220). 
Much retirement was a way to hide increases in unemployment. We know that unemploy­
ment decreases ethnic tolerance, so on the basis of its dramatic increase alone we could ex­
pect an increase in intolerance.
d) Social participation and religiosity
On the basis of changes in social participation and religiosity we can expect an increase 
in intolerance. The elements that were positively correlated with tolerance decreased and the 
one's negatively increased. Social participation in work and civic organizations went signifi­
cantly down. This probably reflects the social fact that lot of the participation in the commu­
nist period was of ritualistic nature. When pressure to participate decreased the participation 
also decreased. Conversely, the pressure for religious participation increased. To be a good 
Croatian meant to be a good and practicing Catholic. This switch in social pressure from 
civic participation to religious participation is clearly reflected in the data showing an in­
crease in religiosity and religious participation.
Table 5: Factor Analysis of Religiosity Measures: Croatia 1989 (N = 2,510) and 1996 (N = 2,202)
Religiosity Questions
Means StandardDeviations Communalities
1989 1996 1989 1996 1989 1996
How deeply do you believe in religion? (1-6) 3.71 4.83 1.55 1.33 .72 .68
Do you (1) believe, (2) have doubts about, or 
(3) don't believe in the existence of God? 2.05 2.68 .84 .63 .76 .68
Do you (1) believe, (2) have doubts about, or 
(3) don't believe in life after death? 1.64 2.27 .79 .80 .57 .50
Do you (1) believe, (2) have doubts about, or 
(3) don't believe that God created people? 1.86 2.49 .85 .74 .74 .72
The presence of church on Croatian TV should be: 
(1) expanded, (2) kept as it is now, (3) reduced. 2.22 1.88 .74 .59 .32 .35
Religious instruction should be: (1) obligatory 
in school, (2) the choice of family and student, 
(3) thrown out of school. 2.06 2.22 .83 .56 .49 .29
How often do you go to church? (1) less than 
once a month, (2) monthly, (3) weekly, (4) daily? 1.52 2.56 .71 1.19 .56 .43
Average 2.15 2.70 .90 .83 .59 .46
1989 religiosity scale: Is' eigenvalue = 4.16, 2nd eigenvalue = .86, alpha = .87
1996 religiosity scale: 1st eigenvalue = 3.64, 2nd eigenvalue = .97, alpha = .82
NOTE: Communalities are based on one factor solutions.
As we can see every aspect of religiosity increased dramatically in the short period of 
seven years. Attendance and “deepness” of believe increased most dramatically. It is interest-
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ing that the only item that decreased is the support for more Church influence on TV. We 
must take into account that in the 1989-1996 period church presence on TV dramatically in­
creased so this reaction can be interpreted as a certain satiation with it. Of course, the in­
crease in religiosity is not only the result of the reversal of social pressure (in communism in 
direction of atheism and in post-communism in direction of religiosity) but also of genuine 
turn toward sacred which is normal consequence of war and destruction. People confronted 
with the evils of war, confronted with dark side of human nature and witnessing the disap­
pearance of a seemingly stable social order and its underlying values, are inclined to look for 
more permanent value basis for their individual lives and the explanation of the world sur­
rounding them. Religion is perfectly suited to offer such answers. The fact that average 
communality (correlation of items with the underlying scale) decreases in 1996 suggests a 
loosening of this dimension. In other words, religiosity became more widespread and ac­
cepted among the people in Croatia but also became more amorphous in the process. By 
spreading more widely it become less coherent and religious had different meaning for dif­
ferent people. In 1989 it was relatively less spread and more coherent in meaning.
Increased religiosity is probably also influenced by demographic change. Croats were 
more religious than Serbs. In the same survey we established that 58% of Croats declared 
that they are believers compared with only 12% of Serbs and 9% of Yugoslavs (S. 
Bahtijarević, 1991:143). The total proportion of declared believers in Croatia was 47% and 
that jumped to 76% in 1996 reflecting demographic change and increased religiosity. De­
crease in the number of Serbs should, net of all other factors increase religiosity of popula­
tion.
The increase in religiosity, combined with decreases in political, work, and civic partici­
pation should, judging by previously established correlations, contribute to a net decrease in 
tolerance.
General hypotheses
On the basis of these changes we can formulate a general explanatory hypothesis that 
the decrease in tolerance in 1989-1996 period is the result of demographic and structural 
changes resulting from war which increase the characteristics connected with intolerance. 
These include an increase in Croatians' relative representation in the population, less urban 
population a drop in mixed marriages and in people with mixed parentage, increases in un­
employment, decreases in civic participation and increases in religiosity. The second process 
which we hypothesize is contributing to decrease in tolerance is the experience of war. The 
large number of people having immediate war experience and the attribution of the war to 
ethno-national tensions should decrease the average ethnic tolerance level.
Hypothesis test
Table 6 presents standardized coefficients from the regression on tolerance on our ex­
planatory model with test for change over time (1989-1996). Standardized coefficients en­
able us to compare effects to each other within columns. For example if we look at column 
(1) - coefficients in 1989 - we can immediately conclude that the factor that by far has the 
most negative influence on tolerance is religiosity. Inversely, the most positive influence on 
tolerance is mixed marriage; but the negative effect of religiosity is much stronger than posi­
tive effect of mixed marriages. If we look at the coefficients in 1996 we can see that religiosity 
is still the strongest predictor of intolerance. Its relative strength to the next factors declined 
because it is 2.25 stronger than being Croat in 1996 compared with 4.6 stronger in 1989. 
Mixed marriage and mixed parentage are the strongest positive predictors of tolerance in 
1996 as they were in 1989.
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Table 6. Standardized Coefficients from Regression of Tolerance on Explanatory Model with Tests 
for Change Over Time, Croatia 1989 and 1996
Combined




Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
DEMOGRAPHIC
Croat -.093“ -.130“ 1 Ö 00 00 -.072“ —. 112C
Serb -.002 .045 .019 -.001 .027
Age -.042 -.026 -.025 -.040 .031
Male -.098“ -.110“ -.090“ 1 Ö OO OO -.005
Urbanism .005 .025 .020 .004 .019
Mixed Parentage .043° .070“ .044“ .036c .020
Mixed Marriage .069“ .103“ .076“ .055° .032°
STATUS
Education -.051 O 00 .012 -.044 .163“
Not in Labor Force .041 -.007 .008 .044 -.042
Unemployed -.035 .037 .009 -.041 .057c
Peasant .014 .020 .019 .012 .005
Blue-Collar -.029 -.024 -.020 -.023 -.002
Manager .021 -.009 .005 .024 -.025
Professional .025 .028 .013 .021 .004
PARTICIPATION
Communist Party -.102 .023 .008 -.010 .202
Work Organizations .042° .034 ,035h .037° -.005
Civic Organizations ,041c -.013 .021 ,032c -.025
Read News -.017 -.070“ -.040“ -.018 -.072
Religiosity -.429“ -.293“ -.353“ -.395“ .070“
1996 - - -.282“ - -.342“
R-Squared .275“ .231“ .406“ .417“
Increase in R-Squared - - - .011“
Sample Size 2510 2202 4712 4712
NOTES: The omitted (baseline) category for nationality is minority nationality. The omitted category 
for occupational position is white-collar. The Chow test includes all the 1996 interactions but not the di­
rect effect of year. Significance levels denoted by: a = p < .001, b — p < .01, c = p < .05.
Column 3 simply combines the two years and tests the year effect that is large, negative 
and significant. That means that tolerance in 1996 was statistically significantly lower than in 
1989. Column 4 is even more directed toward discovering change effects. It is based on one 
equation with a full set of interactions between year and each other independent variable. 
Thus the first column under (4) shows the 1989 effects and the second column shows any 
changes. In that way we can specifically address change and its significance. The increase in
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R-squared (next to bottom row) is telling us that the changes between surveys are significant 
as a whole.
If we analyze changes in individual variables than we can see the following. The first 
and most important thing that we can notice is that Croats are now even more intolerant 
compared with minorities than they were before. Is this change the effect of demographic 
change - the movement of people because of the war - or is that the “genuine” increase in 
absolute levels of intolerance? It appears that the change is not simply reflecting demo­
graphic change because Croats are more intolerant but Serbs are not dramatically more tol­
erant, in spite of the dramatic exodus of the most intolerant Serbs from Croatia as a result of 
military defeat. Although change in tolerance among Serbs is in the positive direction it does 
not reach statistical significance. The conclusion is that regardless of demographic change 
(dramatic decrease of the most intolerant Serbs from Croatia) the average levels of tolerance 
of Serbs did not go statistically significantly up. Demography by itself then cannot explain the 
tolerance decrease among Croats, fewer of whom moved as a result of the war. Also the gen­
eral increase in intolerance from 2.78 to 3.45 (see Table 2). It is important to notice that 
“Croats” are the only group who are significantly more contributing to intolerance (decreas­
ing the tolerance) in 1996 than in 1989. The change for Serbs is that they are relatively more 
tolerance.
Perhaps the most interesting variable is religiosity. It is still the most important factor 
contributing to intolerance (column 2 standardized coefficient for religiosity is -.293 with the 
closest competitor - being a Croat - having the value -.130) but relatively less so in 1996 than 
in 1989. One possible interpretation could be a softening of the connection between religion 
and intolerance. The more probable interpretation is that the wider diffusion of religious 
sentiment introduced large number of new converts who are less adamant in their religious 
beliefs. This diffusion of religiosity weakened the original relationships (although the religi­
osity stayed relatively strongest predictor of intolerance in 1996 as it was in 1989). A similar 
process occurred with unemployment. In any particular year unemployment did not signifi­
cantly contribute to tolerance. But there is evident change in direction of influence in two 
different years. Where in 1989 unemployment increased intolerance) in 1996 unemployment 
was positively correlated with tolerance. This change is significant. As with religion the wid­
ening of the number of unemployed (from 4% to 10.6% of our sample - see Table 5) not only 
weakened original relationship (as in the case of religion) but reversed it from the negative 
too positive.
Mixed marriage is the strongest positive predictor of tolerance in both years analyzed 
but more so in 1996 and the difference is statistically significant. The fact that those in mixed 
marriages are even more tolerant now than before the war signifies probably the “selection” 
process. We have seen that the number of “mixed marriages” significantly declined (from 
15.3% to 6.3% of the sample - Table 5.) Those who stayed in mixed marriages, those who 
stayed in Croatia living in mixed marriage and those who did not manage or did not want to 
manage some form of “passing” of one of the partners are even more committed to tolerance 
than the same group before. These are the people who are living contra social pressure of 
“Croatization” and by their own example deny the thesis of incompatibility of two ethnicities. 
The social pressure on “mixed marriages” are maybe best symbolized by the election cam­
paign statement by late president Franjo Tuđman in 1990 that “He is happy that his wife is 
neither Jewish nor Serbian” (Čulić, 1999:52).
Another important change is for education. In 1989 it is not a relevant factor and in 
1996 it jumps to being major predictor of tolerance. The change is statistically significant. 
The change presents interesting problem for interpretation although the question can be 
posed more in the direction why education was not important in 1989 and is becoming now 
in explaining tolerance. There are two elements probably important in interpreting this
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change. The first is that education was not a discriminating factor when tolerance was gener­
ally higher. In the situation of lowering the tolerance education is one factor which is pre­
venting this slide into “intolerance”. The other, not incompatible with the first, is that the net 
immigration/emigration effect produced lowering of the average educational level Table 5) 
in which situation education becomes more important.
We must also note that the positive effect of civic participation disappear (column 2 ver­
sus 1). With decreased participation its important for tolerance disappears. Here the effect 
cannot be attributed to the expansion of participation because it was reduced and not in­
creased.
A final interesting change is in reading news. In 1989 it was not a significant predictor 
of intolerance but in 1996 it becomes so, although the change does not reach statistical signif­
icance. Reading the news more frequently in 1996 significantly increases intolerance. Two 
contradictory interpretations are possible. One is that in 1989 the news in Croatia were still 
not based on nationalist propaganda - that was still the period when the Communist were 
controlling the newspaper and although they were reporting extensively about the nationalist 
development in Serbia the tone was still not nationalist. This interpretation is attributing cau­
sality from the character of the news toward the recipients of the news. In 1996 when major­
ity of newspapers were controlled by the extremely nationalist government and the tone of 
newspapers become nationalistic that produced changes in tolerance. The other interpreta­
tion is of course possible which is reversing the causal chain - those who are more nationalis­
tic are simply reading more news because they are finding the content in them which is in ac­
cordance with their attitudes.
This analysis allows us to reject the first part of the hypothesis. Although demographic 
and structural change occurring in Croatia as a consequence of war is driving intolerance up 
this is not the whole explanation. Intolerance increased more than we could expect based 
only on the demographic and structural change. Something happened what has driven the in­
tolerance of Croats up. Of course we know that this intermediate event is war. Now we turn 
to test the second part of the hypothesis that the individual war experience influenced intol­
erance. In order to test this hypothesis we turn to Table 7.
Table 7. Standardized Coefficients from Regression of Tolerance on Explanatory Model with Tests 
for War Effects: Croatia 1989, 1996 (N = 4,712)
Combined Combined Combined
Independent Variables Baseline Interactions Baseline Interactions Baseline Interactions
(1989) (1996) (1989) (1996) (1989) (1996)
Model (1) (2) (3)
DEMOGRAPHIC
Croat -.071“ -.115° -.071" -.113c -.071“ -.115'
Serb -.002 .029 -.002 .030 -.002 .031
Age -.027 -.032 -.032
Male -.09 1“ .1 o oo -.088“
Urbanism .014 .012 .012
Mixed Parentage .037° .020 .037° .020 .037° .021
Mixed Marriage .054a .033c .055“ .035c .054“ .035°
STATUS
Education -.045° .173“ 1 Ö .177“ -047c .176“
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Combined Combined Combined
Independent Variables Baseline Interactions Baseline Interactions Baseline Interactions
(1989) (1996) (1989) (1996) (1989) (1996)
Model (1) (2) (3)
Not in Labor Force .016 .017 .018
Unemployed -.039 .059b -.041 ,063h -.041 .063b
Peasant .016 .012 .012
Blue-Collar -.024 -.026 -.026
Manager .004 .004 .003
Professional .021 .021 .021
PARTICIPATION
Communist Party .003 .003 .003
Work Organizations .038b .037b .037h
Civic Organizations ,032c -.024 .031c -.022 .032c -.023
Read News .018 -.071 -.019 -.062 -.019 -.062
Religiosity -.393“ .065“ -.392“ .072“ -.392“ .073“
1996 - -.318“ - -.319“ - -.302“
WAR EXPERIENCES
Served in Military - - - .050 - .051
Months Served - - - -.046 - -.048
War Experiences (20) - - - -.024 - -.020
War Losses (6) - - - -.048“ - -.047“
PSYCH. EFFECTS
Fearful in Last 5 Years - - - - - -.028
Post-Traumatic Stress - - - - - .006
Total R-Squared .416“ .421“ .421“
Increase in R-Squared - .005“ .000
NOTE: Only the interactions in effects between years (Table 5, Model 4, Column 2) that are significant 
at the 10 level are included in the models estimated for this table. Significance denoted by:a = .001,b = 
.01, c = .05 (2-tailed t-tests).
This table retains only the interactions (changes over time) that are statistically signifi­
cant at the generous 10 level. On that way the “real” changes are more visible without the 
distraction of statistically insignificant changes.
The main answer to our hypothesis comes from the “war experiences” panel of column 
2 and “psychological effects” panel, which is added in column 3. The main surprising conclu­
sion is that the changes over time in tolerance are not result of people's war experiences. Re­
ported war experiences have very little effect and do not dampen or explain away any of the 
significant changes in 1996. We can reject the second part of our main hypothesis that the in­
crease in intolerance is the result of individual war experiences. Croats are more intolerant 
regardless of individual war experiences. The only exception is war material losses (loss of 
house, apartment, etc.) which significantly increase intolerance. War experiences (being refu­
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gee, wounded, being hungry etc), military service, the length of the service and psychological 
effects of war (being fearful in connection with war events or having post-traumatic stress 
symptoms) are not increasing intolerance. We can comfortably reject our hypothesis that the 
increase of intolerance can be explained using direct effects of war on the life of individuals 
and their families. War experiences are not the explanation of increased intolerance and only 
direct material losses are increasing intolerance.
We can conclude that neither the demographic change nor the individual war experi­
ence is full explanation of the increased intolerance in the 1989-1996 period. The increased 
intolerance is result of the process - we presume closely connected with the war - which is 
untapped by our indicators of demographic and structural change and by the individual war 
experiences.
Attempt to explain change
How can we explain the increased intolerance among Croats? The obvious answer is 
that the intolerance increased as a consequence of war. The most important interpolated fac­
tor between 1989 and 1996 was war. That as such has an important theoretical significance to 
which we will come later - the intolerance increased as consequence but was not the cause of 
war. But our attempt to explain this increase by mere demographic and structural changes 
and by individual experience of war events proved to be unsuccessful - the increased intoler­
ance is not fully explained by the immediate war experiences as is not a direct result of ethnic 
homogenisation and other structural changes resulting from the war.
In our interpretation the war has produced change in intolerance on collective level 
which is untapped using individual level explanation. The effects of war are much broader 
than individual experience or even individual psychological effects of war. Although we ac­
cept that the war produced increase in intolerance we want to explain this phenomena. To ex­
plain means to find variables that can be put between the “war” and the “tolerance”. 
Namely, how or through what processes war event changes the tolerance levels? We have 
shown that demographic change or individual experience and individual effects of war are 
not adequate explanations of the increased intolerance.
The point is not that the people had individual losses (although material losses proved 
to be important in increasing intolerance) but that the collective perception has changed as 
the result of war. We can use here the framework developed by Herbert Blumer (1955/1988) 
for understanding prejudices. “A basic understanding of race prejudice must be sought in the 
process by which racial groups form images of themselves and of others. This process...is fun­
damentally a collective process” (Blumer, 1988:197). Blumer continues, “[This process] oper­
ates chiefly through the public media in which individuals who are accepted as the spokes­
man of a racial group characterize publicly another racial group” (Blumer, 1988:197-98). 
This framework can be used to understand the changes in ethnic tolerance (instead of preju­
dices, which was Blumer's subject). Among Croats the perception of the “others” has 
changed. In general terms the whole “frame” for understanding the reality has changed. 
Oberschall (2000) uses the concept of cognitive frame. There are cognitive frames for peace­
ful times and frames for war. The most important thing is to mobilize the frame for war that 
did not prevail before the war.
This process as described by Blumer is a continuous one where the constant redefini­
tion of the other racial groups took place. The one dimension of this process is communica­
tion with the most important part played by the dominant group members. The dominant 
group members, in our case political leaders, intellectuals, and journalists, are influencing 
the creation of picture of others and contributing that the intolerance toward others in­
creases. The attempt of the regime with its monopolization of TV and key printed media and 
the important roles of intellectuals and journalists who start to dominate the public space
51
Sekulić, D., Hodson, R., Massey, G.: War and Tolerance Revija za sociologiju, Vol XXXIII. (2002), No 1-2: 33-57
made intolerance not only acceptable but also “required” social behaviour. In the previous 
communist regime social pressure created “downward falsification” (Kumar, 1998) of behav­
iour (of prejudiced people not transforming their prejudices into discrimination or in our 
case of falsifying believes toward reporting tolerant attitudes) - or what will in Merton's 
typology be a “timid bigotry.” The new nationalist regime and social expectations created by 
it, in contrast, are favorable for “upward falsification” (Kumar, 1998) or in Merton's typology 
a “Fair-weather liberal” in the sens that the intolerance was favored. As Blumer is saying the 
creation of image of the “others” is more influenced by those who are forming the people's 
opinion than the experience of individuals themselves. Or in other words, opinion (tolerance 
in our case) is not built as an aggregation of individual experiences (in our case measured by 
the experiences resulting from war), but the other way around: opinions come from opinion 
creators who are successfully changing the frame for understanding the events surrounding 
people and influencing their lives. “The building of the image of the abstract group takes 
place in the area of the remote and not of the near. It is not the experience with concrete in­
dividuals in daily associations that gives rise to the definitions of the extended, abstract 
group. Such immediate experience is usually regulated and orderly. Even where such imme­
diate experience is disrupted the new definitions which are formed are limited to the individ­
uals involved. The collective image of the abstract group grows up not by generalizing from 
experiences gained in close, first-hand contacts but through the transcending characteriza­
tions that are made of the groups as an entity” (Blumer, 1998:203). If the whole frame cre­
ated by the public discourse is pushing the individual definition of the situation in the second 
direction we can expect that intolerance necessarily increase.
Blumer is saying that these definitions are forged in the public arena with the crucial 
role of big events. The war is such crucial event in our case. The interpretation of war in the 
public arena, the creation of public image of the “others” and pushing ethno-national inter­
pretations into the center stage of the situational definitions increased the importance of the 
“national” and consequently intolerance toward those who are perceived and/or really are 
dangerous. Oberschall's (2000) finds the main explanation for the process in mass propa­
ganda, the use of threat, repeat, plain falsification of truth, and on the fact that our knowl­
edge is not based on personal experience but on what others are convincing for us. All these 
are “top down” processes, to use the previously mentioned terminology used in the Heague 
courtroom. In our opinion this is only partially true. Although those in political power and 
controlling the media are most responsible for directly influencing the opinions and beliefs 
and for providing the context in which the definitions are made, the process is much more 
complex and “democratic”. As formulated by Somer “elite strategies of inciting ethno- 
nationalism found a large and responsive audience among common people, which is a factor 
that needs to be explained not by resorting to ostensible ancient visceral hatreds but by ex­
amining ethnic and national self-images in modern Yugoslavia and the policies that culti­
vated them (2001:135-136). To return again to Blumer “the process of definition occurs obvi­
ously through complex interaction and communication between the members of the domi­
nant group. Leaders, prestige bearers, officials, group agents, dominant individuals, and ordi­
nary laymen present to one another characterisations of the subordinate group and express 
their feelings and ideas on the relations. Through talk, tales, stories, gossip, anecdotes, mes­
sages, pronouncements, news accounts, orations, sermons, preachments, and the like, defini­
tions are presented and feelings are expressed” (Blumer, 1998:202). This constant redefini­
tion goes in all directions, not only top-down, although the top creates important framework. 
This process explains how the people who lived peacefully together turned out against each 
other - but also explains why we have so many stories of neighbours of different ethnicities 
helping each other's in difficulties.
Županov (1995:38-39) explains the redefinition of friendly neighbouring relations 
(“komšiluk”) which existed in villages and cities of former Yugoslavia. He explains how the
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people from the villages where the hostility started reinterpreted their neighbouring relations 
in the sense that the “others” just waited for the moment to “stick the knife in our back.” 
The living together was a lie and based on false pretences of friendliness. “Such an interpre­
tation was taken by the refugees into the areas unaffected by war, especially into Croatian 
cities. Besides, their live stories, (including the mentioned interpretation) were widely popu­
larised by media (newspapers, radio, TV) and were through this brought to every Croatian 
family. That affected primary relations in unaffected areas, especially in cities, analogous the 
effect of hot fir-cones, which in fire spread throughout the forest. The people start to apply 
the refugees' definition on their neighbours in the apartment houses and on their colleagues 
on work who are of different nationality. They ask themselves if this neighbour and colleague 
is the hidden enemy who waits for his chance to kill me, rob me and cleanse me” (Županov, 
1995:39-40).
In conclusion we can argue that the increase in intolerance is best explained as a collec­
tive process of the situation redefinition. The war changed the perceptions of others and re­
defined relationships toward others. This process was based on complex interaction of lead­
ers on the one side combined with spontaneous processes of redefinition of the situation re­
sulting from the isolated incidents of ethnic conflict and than spreading around like the 
bushfire. In this cascading process change of the definition of situation is nothing like the ex­
plosion of ancient hatreds. The people's friendly neighbouring relations were no less genuine 
than today's animosity and increased intolerance. Through the process which some author 
call “cascades” (Somer, 2001) the behaviours and perceptions of people change. “Cascades 
are self-reinforcing processes that change the behaviour of a group of people through inter­
personal dependencies.... Cascade models explain situations in which the individual's incen­
tives for taking an action, holding a belief, or confronting to a norm depend significantly on 
the behaviour of others” (Somer, 2001:129). The cascading process changes behaviour and 
attitudes and it is very difficult to stop it when it starts. As formulated by Kuran “...the 
greater the rewards for making public display of one's ethnicity and the larger the punish­
ment for failing to do so, the stronger are the incentives to substitute ethnic behaviours for 
generic one” (Kummar, 1998:43). But as we argue, it is not only the conformism (although in 
many instances that is the case also) but also the redefinition of the situation. What psycholo­
gist call “AHA” effect - the individual feels that he discovered the fact that his neighbours 
were always hidden enemies although until yesterday they had friendly neighbouring rela­
tions. The individuals recognized the importance of ethno-national identity although until 
yesterday it was not crucial in his self-definition. In our case this spontaneous process was of 
course enforced from above by the definitions provided by the key political and intellectual 
figures of the regime. This complex collective process explains the increased tolerance of 
Croats resulting from war which occurred between our two points of data collection.
Discussions and conclusions
a) “Top-bottom” or “Bottom-up”?
On the basis of our data and previous analysis how can we look now at the debate domi­
nating the Hague court room? Was the nationalism and hatred (measured in our analysis as 
ethnic tolerance) instigated from the “top”, by political leaders in Croatia and especially by 
President Tuđman, or were the leaders simply responding to popular nationalist sentiments?
The crucial argument used by Meštrović was that intolerance was already high before 
Tuđman's rise to power so that cannot be accused for instigating something that was already 
there. “Intolerance and nationalism rose, and a sense of being Yugoslav fell, from 1984 to 
1989, a time period in which Serbs began to articulate their plans for a “Greater Serbia” and 
Milošević gained more power, but before Franjo Tuđman's rise to power.” (Meštrović, 1995:
53
Sekulić, D., Hodson, R., Massey. G.: War and Tolerance Revija za sociologiju. Vol XXXIII. (2002), No 1-2: 33-57
6). Although Meštrović is using our previous research (Hodson, Sekulić and Massey, 1994; 
and Massey, Hodson and Sekulić, 1999) as corroboration of his argument the fact was that 
the research was not designed to answer such question. It was a cross-sectional analysis more 
appropriate to answer the question if the differences in the outbreak of hostilities in different 
parts of the former Yugoslavia are explainable by differences in tolerance levels. (The an­
swer we gave was a clear and unequivocal, no.) Our present analysis is much more suited to 
answer the question posed by Meštrović. The fact that the tolerance level did not change in 
1985-1989 period but that intolerance increased in 1989-1996 period contradicts Meštrović's 
main claim. The intolerance level was not high before Tuđman came to power but it become 
high after his rise to power.
If we stay on very simplistic level of conceptual analysis used by Meštrović we could stop 
here and claim that we proved that he was simply wrong because of stretching his interpreta­
tions to far and not having data for more than one point in time. But first we should note 
that tolerance is just one dimension of social life and what Meštrović and other observers of 
events were claiming was increased political tensions, nationalism, and fear. What we claim 
here is simply that this increased political tensions and probably fear did not translate into 
increased intolerance. Tolerance as we measured it is just one dimension of complex web of 
social relations and beliefs.2
It is an undeniable fact that political tensions in the observed period (from 1984 to 
1989) were rising. People were aware of it, were feeling it, were contributing to it and were 
reacting to it. But what we are claiming is that those objectively existing tensions did not 
translate into individual level. The best proof for this are the result from the survey reported 
by Dugandžija (1991). When asked to judge inter ethnic relations in Yugoslavia 43% of the 
sample responded that they are very bad. When asked to evaluate inter ethnic relations in 
their place of living only 2.7% evaluated them as very bad. Obviously the bad relations are 
somewhere “out there”, not “here”. That means that people were aware of the worsening of 
the situation but they did not translate it yet into their interpersonal relations in the place 
were they live. That is the context in which we should interpret the fact that in spite of the 
worsening of the general political situation based on strong exploitation of national feelings 
and nationalist propaganda this was still not translated on the individual level.
The combination of war, the reinterpretation of the whole situation by the leaders and 
opinion makers changed this dramatically in 1989 and intolerance on the individual level in­
creased. The mechanism described by Županov is political propaganda: the “major influence 
in public discussion... by individuals and groups that have the public ear and who are felt to 
have standing, prestige, authority, and power” (Blumer, 1988:204). The fact that intolerance 
did not increase in 1984-89 period, although as we can see in Duganđžija's data the general 
perception of the worsening relations on global level did, made the interpretation that lead­
ers were simply following the mass opinions to simplistic. The leaders were important in cre­
ating the new discourse, in defining the situation in order to “define and redefine the subor­
dinate racial group and the relations between them” (Blumer, 1988:202). To claim that Presi­
dent Tuđman and his vitriolic statements (starting with that that he is happy that his wife is 
neither Serbian nor Jewish) did not contribute to “redefine” the situation and the Serbian 
minority is very difficult to understand. He personally and his party in general were impor­
2 V. Katunarić (1991) showed that the social distance of Croats toward Serbs (measured in the di­
mensions of preferred marriage partners and friends) increased in the same period. Meštrović also uses 
this as evidence supporting his argument. Here he ignores the fact that the Serbs did not reciprocate in­
creased distance by Croats; rather, the social distance decreased. Also he is ignoring the fact that 
Katunarić is attributing the increased social to macro political processes - mostly the electoral campaign 
which was taking place at the time of survey with parties sending their messages full of ethnocentric 
charge (Katunarić, 1991:134). The situation was obviously more complex than Meštrović wants to imply.
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tant contributors to influence and change the public discourse, to redefine the “subordinate 
racial group and the relations between them” in Blumer sense. That this was not a simple 
“top-bottom” process is also clear. Tuđman and his party changed relatively high tolerance 
into intolerance in complex and interactive process defined the war instigated by the Serbian 
power holders. Our finding clearly indicates that the change of intolerance was significant 
and not explainable by individual war experiences. It was a change of how people (Croats) 
define the situation and the other group. This change was influenced by events and interpre­
tation provided of the events by the leadership which changed the public discourse into di­
rection of extreme nationalism and relatively high intolerance on the individual level.
b) Primordialism or Instrumentalism
What is the significance of our results for the primordialist-instrumentalist debate? Al­
though our data are not designed to directly prove or disprove any of these theories we can 
argue that they are much more in accordance with the instrumentalist approach. Namely, the 
mere fact that intolerance varies significantly is at odds with primordialism. It predicts con­
stant and high levels of intolerance. The pattern of variation is also much more in accordance 
with instrumentalist approaches. The increase in tolerance does not predate conflict (as we 
can expect from the primordialist approaches) but antedates it as predicted by instrumental­
ist theories.
We argue that changes in intolerance are not a result of simple top-bottom manipula­
tion. The variation in intolerance does not correspond directly to mass manipulation of pub­
lic media by political elites (Županov, Sekulić, Šporer, 1996:411-415) but must also be ex­
plained as a change in situational definitions in Blumer's sense.
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Kojim se to teorijskim ok\’irom - a riječ je o primordijalističkom nasu­
prot instrumentalističkomu - ponajbolje objašnjava etnička mobilizacija i su­
kob? Uzevši u obzir rasprave u vezi s raspadom Jugoslavije, članak je usredo­
točen na pitanje: je li sve veća etnička netolerancija prethodila sve većim
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etničkim napetostima i, susljedno tome, oružanom sukobu između različitih 
gmpa? Odnosno, je li povećana etnička netolerancija bila posljedicom samog 
sukoba? Prvi bi rezultat bio u skladu s primordijalističkim okvirom objašnje­
nja. Drugi bi se rezultat očekivao na osnovu instrumentalističkog teorijskog 
okvira. LJ nalaženju odgovora na ta pitanja poslužili smo se trima skupovima 
podataka iz Hrvatske - anketnim istraživanjima iz 1985, 1989. i 1996. godine. 
Razdoblje između piva dva istraživanjima označeno je povećanjem napetosti, 
slijedilo je razdoblje oružanog sukoba (1991-1995). Treće je istraživa- nje 
izvršeno na početku mirnog razdoblja.
Naš je zaključak taj da je do netolerancije došlo nakon izbijanja rata i 
zločina povezanih s tim. Stoga smatramo da su naši nalazi bliže instrumenta- 
lističkom negoli primordijalističkom teorijskom okviru. Ipak, naša analiza 
nije namijenjena promoviranju instrumentalizma kao najboljeg objašnjenja 
sukoba na Balkanu: prije će biti da je njen cilj bio da diskreditira primordijali- 
stičko objašnjenje.
Ključne riječi: ETNIČKA MOBILIZACIJA, RASPAD JUGOSLAVIJE,
RAT
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